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Rawls v. Early: A Refusal to Imply Conditions of Survivorship
Upon Ascertained Contingent Remaindermen
Courts traditionally have considered the intent of the testator in construing
future interests created by a testator's will.I Yet the decision of courts to impose
a condition of survivorship upon a contingent future interest often frustrates the
intent of the testator.2 As recently as 1966, in Lawson v. Lawson,3 the North
Carolina Supreme Court implied a condition of survivorship upon a contingent
gift to a class, invalidating the interests of the contingent remaindermen who
predeceased the life tenant.4 Until 1989, however, North Carolina courts had
not considered whether the requirement of survivorship for contingent class gifts
should apply to the contingent interests of ascertained individuals. In Rawls v.
Early5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals specifically refused to extend the
class survivorship requirement to individuals named as contingent remainder-
men.6 In its decision, the court relied upon the established doctrine of transfera-
bility of contingent interests and the distinction between contingent interests of a
class and contingent interests of an individual. 7
This Note examines the history of the implied survivorship requirement for
contingent class gifts and the reasons why such a requirement arose. The Note
explains the rule of transferability of contingent interests, including the distinc-
tion between contingencies based upon an uncertain event and those based upon
an unascertainable person. In addition, it discusses the advantages and disad-
vantages of an implied requirement of survivorship. The Note concludes that
the North Carolina Court of Appeals' reliance upon the doctrine of transferabil-
ity effectively refutes implied conditions of survivorship for contingent interests
in ascertained individuals.
In Rawis v. Early8 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
"whether in addition to being subject to the condition precedent of the life ten-
ant not being survived by children, the contingent remainder interest of an ascer-
tained remainderman is also subject to an implied condition of the
remainderman surviving the life tenant."9 The court considered the rights of the
parties according to the will of the testator, Telie M. Odom, who died in 1963.10
1. See Jernigan v. Lee, 279 N.C. 341, 344, 182 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1971); see also 1 L. SIMas &
A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTER r § 3, at 6 (2d ed. 1956) ("In no other way is it possible
to understand the meaning of many of the provisions in [the law of future interests] ... than by
carefully considering the purposes which were sought by those creating the interests involved.").
2. See Note, The Schau v. Cecil Survival Requirement: Consequences for Iowa Property Law,
63 IowA L. REv. 924, 945-46 (1978).
3. 267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966).
4. Id. at 645, 148 S.E.2d at 548.
5. 94 N.C. App. 677, 381 S.E.2d 166, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 547, 385 S.E.2d 500 (1989).
6. Id. at 681-82, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
7. Id.
8. 94 N.C. App. 677, 381 S.E.2d 166, disc rev. denied, 325 N.C. 547, 385 S.E.2d 500 (1989).
9. Id. at 679, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
10. Id. at 678, 381 S.E.2d at 167.
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The third paragraph of the will granted a life estate to her son, Norman Ray
Odom, and continued:
[A]nd if he has children then to his said children in fee simple, and if
the said Norman Ray Odom shall die and does not leave children liv-
ing at the time of his death, then I give and devise my said real estate
to Izetta Rawls, my niece, in fee simple. 1
Norman Ray Odom, the life tenant, died childless in 1985.12 Thus, the
contingent remainder in his children never vested. Izetta Rawils died in 1978,
survived by her heirs at law, Ethel Rawls and Cula Early.' 3 As the heirs of
Izetta Rawls, Ethel Rawls and Cula Early assumed that they each received an
interest in the property of Telie Odom. In November of 1986, Ethel RawIs con-
veyed her one-half undivided interest in the property to the grantee, Douglas
Rawls. 14 Douglas Rawls sought to partition the property, and the trial court
allowed the heirs at law of Norman Ray Odom to intervene.15 According to the
heirs, because Izetta Rawls failed to survive the life tenant, her interest in the
property never vested. 16 Failure of the devise according to the will of the testator
would result in the property passing through intestacy, and because the testa-
tor's only son, Norman Ray Odom, would have received the property, the prop-
erty was inheritable by Norman's heirs upon his death.
The trial court agreed with the heirs of Norman Ray Odom.17 According
to the lower court, because Izetta Rawls predeceased the life tenant, her contin-
gent remainder failed to vest. As a result, Ethel Rawls and Cula Early never
inherited the property from Izetta Rawls, and the deed from Ethel Rawls to
Douglas Rawls did not convey an interest.' 8
The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's deci-
sion that Izetta Rawls held a contingent remainder before the death of the life
tenant without children. 19 Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court, finding that the contingent remainder did vest in Izetta Rawls.2° The
court reasoned that "a contingent remainder may be assigned where the ultimate
taker is ascertained."2 ' The alternative contingent remainder to Izetta depended
upon an uncertain event: the life tenant's death without children.22 Izetta Rawls,
as the ascertained "ultimate taker," could convey her interest,2 3 and her heirs
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 679, 381 S.E.2d at 167.
15. Id. at 678, 381 S.E.2d at 167.
16. Id. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169; see also Intervenor Respondent Appellees' Brief at 16, Rawls
(No. 886SC867).
17. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 679, 381 S.E.2d at 167-68.
18. Id. at 679, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
19. Id. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
20. Id. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
21. Id. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 3 N.C. App. 536, 541, 165 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1969) (emphasis
added)).
22. Id. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
23. Id. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
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inherited her interest upon her death.24
North Carolina joined the majority of other jurisdictions with the court of
appeals' decision in Rawls. Most states do not impose an implied survival re-
quirement.25 A few states, by contrast, will void a contingent remainder or an
executory devise to an ascertained individual if the individual predeceases the
life tenant.2 6
The court of appeals allowed the alternative contingent remainder to vest in
Izetta Rawls; the contingent remainder to the children of Norman Ray Odom
(the life tenant) failed upon his death without children.27 Earlier North Carolina
courts, relying upon the common law, would have invalidated the alternative
contingent remainder to Izetta Rawls upon creation of the interest.28 Before
1827 North Carolina courts held that a devise "to A for life, and if A should die
with issue, to A's issue; but if A dies without issue, to B" required A to die with
issue during the testator's life.29 Thus, the contingent remainder vested at the
death of the testator, and if A did not die during the testator's lifetime, the
contingent remainder to B failed.30 The North Carolina court explained in Sain
v. Baker:
[T]his [interpretation] was a strained construction, for the will speaks
as of the time of the testator's death, and naturally would contemplate
the death of the devisee, without issue, at a subsequent date. The rea-
24. Id. at 682, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
25. See, ag., In Re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 776,789, 361 P.2d 900, 904-05, 13 Cal. Rptr. 180,
185 (1961); Jossey v. Brown, 119 Ga. 758, 764, 47 S.E. 350, 353 (1904); Evans v. Giles, 83 Ill. 2d
448, 456, 415 N.E.2d 354, 357-58 (1980); Saulsberry v. Second Nat'l Bank, 400 S.W.2d 506, 507
(Ky. 1966); Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 386-88, 209 S.W. 535, 538 (1919); Fisher v. Wagner, 109
Md. 243, 256, 71 A. 999, 1004 (1909); Tapley v. Dill, 358 Mo. 824, 830-31, 217 S.W.2d 369, 372-73
(1949); Concord Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 113 N.H. 490, 494-95, 310 A.2d 130, 132-33 (1973); King v.
First Nat'l Bank, 135 N.J. Eq. 319, 324-25, 38 A.2d 445, 448 (1944); In Re Young's Will, 62 Misc.
2d 86, 91, 308 N.Y.S.2d 585, 590 (1969); Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 271 (Okla. 1967);
Loring v. Arnold, 15 RI. 428, 429, 8 A. 335, 336 (1887); Black v. Todd, 121 S.C. 243, 252-53, 113
S.E. 793, 796 (1922); Johnson v. Moore, 223 S.W.2d 325, 327-28 (Texas Ct. App. 1949); Shufeldt v.
Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 266-67, 227 P. 6, 11 (1924).
In addition, many jurisdictions allow members of a class who predeceased the life tenant to
transfer or devise their contingent interests. See, eg., Williams v. Houck, 143 Conn. 433, 44243,
123 A.2d 177, 181 (1956); Owens v. Davis, 224 Ga. 146, 148-49, 160 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1968); Hofing
v. Willis, 31 Ill. 2d 365, 373, 201 N.E.2d 852, 856 (1964); In Re Jamieson Estate, 374 Mich. 231,
252-53, 132 N.W.2d 1, 12-13 (1965); Colony v. Colony, 97 N.H. 386, 390-91, 89 A.2d 909, 911-12
(1952); In Re Estate of Stevens, 155 N.J. Super. 575, 581, 383 A.2d 135, 138 (1978); Daniel v.
Donohue, 215 Or. 373, 392, 333 P.2d 1109, 1118 (1959); In Re Estate of Dickson, 396 Pa. 371, 373-
74, 152 A.2d 680, 681-82 (1959); In Re Massey's Estate, 235 Pa. 289, 293, 83 A. 1087, 1089 (1912);
Rennolds v. Branch, 182 Va. 678, 686-88, 29 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1944); Patton v. Corley, 107 W. Va.
318, 320-21, 148 S.E. 120, 121 (1929).
26. See Fletcher v. Hurdle, 259 Ark. 640, 646-47, 536 S.W.2d 109, 112-13 (1976); Schau v.
Cecil, 257 Iowa 1296, 1301, 136 N.W.2d 515, 519 (1965); Snow v. President of Bowdoin College, 133
Me. 195, 198, 175 A. 268, 270 (1934). For criticism of Fletcher and Schau, see Note, Fletcher v.
Hurdle: Implied Condition of Survivorship to Contingent Remainders, 31 ARK. L. REv. 134 (1977)
[hereinafter Implied Condition of Survivorship]; Note, Future Interests-Transmissibility of Contin-
gent Interests, 20 ARK. L. RaV. 190 (1966) (discussing Schau v. Cecil); Note, supra note 2; Note,
Future Interests-Implying a Requirement of Survival in Future Interestv Continued Confusion-
Schau v. Cecil, 65 MICH. L. Rav. 203 (1966) [hereinafter Future Interests].
27. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 680-81, 381 S.E.2d at 168-69.
28. Sain v. Baker, 128 N.C. 256, 258-59, 38 S.E. 858, 859 (1901).
29. See id. at 258, 38 S.E. at 859.
30. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 99 N.C. 308, 311-12, 5 S.E. 430, 432 (1888).
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son given, however, was that if it was held to mean a dying after the
testator's death, without heirs, or without issue, that would be by com-
mon law rules any future failure of heirs, and the devise would fail for
remoteness.
3 1
The Statute of 182732 altered the common law's "strained construction." 33
The statute established a definite time for the vesting of the estate and deter-
mined that the contingency (the life tenant's failure to have children) should
remain in effect until the death of the life tenant.34 Dying without issue became
"referable to the death of the first taker of the fee without issue living at the time
of his death, and not to the death of any other person."' 35 The Statute of 1827,
now codified as section 41-4 of the North Carolina General Statutes, has become
such a well-established doctrine that the Rawls court assumed, without discus-
sion, that the estate would vest at the life tenant's death with or without issue.36
Although perhaps taken for granted in Rawls, earlier courts' interpretations of
section 41-4 contributed to the implied requirement for survivorship in contin-
gent gifts to classes.37 Because the North Carolina Court of Appeals distin-
guished between contingent remainders to individuals and contingent
remainders to classes in Rawls,38 the history of the implied survivorship require-
ment for contingent class interests becomes important in understanding such a
distinction.
The early rule for class gifts in North Carolina, represented by Sanderlin v.
Deford,39 did not require members of a class with a contingent future interest to
survive the life tenant.4° The testator in Sanderlin devised a life estate to his son,
and at the son's death, to the heirs of the son's body; and if the son died without
heirs, to the children of W.W. and Maxcy Sanderlin. 41 The son died without
issue, and several of W.W. and Maxcy Sanderlin's children predeceased the life
tenant.42 The court concluded that the administrator of the deceased children's
estates received a share of the property, along with the surviving children of
31. Sain, 128 N.C. at 258, 38 S.E. at 859.
32. Act effective Jan. 15, 1828, ch. 7, 1827-1828 N.C. Laws 13 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 41-4 (1984)).
33. Sain, 128 N.C. at 258-59, 38 S.E. at 859. According to the statute:
Every contingent limitation in any deed or will, made to depend upon the dying of any
person without heir or heirs of the body, or without issue or issues of the body, or without
children... shall be held and interpreted a limitation to take effect when such person dies
not having such heir, or issue, or child ... living at the time of his death, or born to him
within 10 lunar months thereafter, unless the intention of such limitation be otherwise, and
expressly and plainly declared in the face of the deed or will creating it.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1984).
34. Bell v. Keesler, 175 N.C. 525, 528, 95 S.E. 881, 882 (1918).
35. Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N.C. 448, 455, 99 S.E. 401, 404 (1919).
36. See Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
37. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
38. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
39. 47 N.C. (I Jones) 75 (1854).
40. Id. at 79.
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id. at 75.
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W.W. and Maxey Sanderlin.43 The court stated that "[tihe legacy given to the
children as a class was necessarily executory and contingent, and yet... each
child took such an interest in it that upon his or her death, before the contingent
event happened, it devolved upon his or her representatives." 44
North Carolina courts after Sanderlin did not adhere to the rule it estab-
lished, however. Courts began to interpret the language of section 41-4 as re-
quiring that "the roll must be called as of the date of the death of the first
taker" 45 and "[o]nly those who can answer the roll immediately... acquire any
estate in the properties granted."'46 One student author pointed to the use of the
"roll call" language as "apparently [deterring] the court from the rule set forth
in Sanderlin."47 "lit makes sense to call the roll1 48 when the testator expressly
provides that only surviving members of a class receive an interest.49 Yet North
Carolina courts, relying upon the cases addressing express survivorship require-
ments, have interpreted the "roll call" language to imply a survival requirement,
even when the testator's will expressed only a condition precedent unrelated to
survival.50
Lawson v. Lawson 51 provides the clearest example of the misuse of the "roll
call" language to imply a survivorship requirement. 52 In Lawson the testator
devised a life estate to her daughter, and at her death "to her children, if any, in
fee simple; if none to the whole brothers and sisters of [her] daughter" in fee
simple. 53 Although the contingent interest of the brothers and sisters depended
only upon the life tenant's death without children, the North Carolina Supreme
Court determined that the brothers and sisters who predeceased the life tenant
"could not answer the roll call at her death."' 54 Further, "[o]nly those who can
43. Id. at 80.
44. Id. at 79; accord Newkirk v. Hawes, 58 N.C. 265, 268 (1859) (because the contingent re-
mainder depended upon an uncertain event, rather than an uncertain person, the contingent remain-
der to the "lawful heirs of the testator's body" vested in the estates of the class members who
predeceased the life tenant).
45. Turpin v. Jarrett, 226 N.C. 135, 136, 37 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1946).
46. Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 84, 130 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1963); accord Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 453, 70 S.E.2d 578, 583 (1952), Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 34, 36-37, 65 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1951).
47. Note, Future Interests--Contingent Class Gifts--Implied Conditions of Survivorship, 45
N.C.L. REv. 264, 268 (1966).
48. Roberts, Class Gifts in North Carolina-When Do We "Call The Roll"?, 21 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1, 18 (1985).
49. Id. at 18 & n.113 (citing, among others, Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 200 S.E.2d 635
(1973); Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963); and Strick-
land v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22 (1963)).
50. E.g., Lawson v. Lawson, 267 N.C. 643, 644-45, 148 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1966); Tunnell v.
Berry, 73 N.C. App. 222, 226-27, 326 S.E.2d 288, 291, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 332 S.E.2d
184 (1985); see Note, supra note 47, at 268-69 (The Lawson court relied upon the "roll call" language
used to interpret an express survivorship requirement to imply a condition of survival. "[A] rule
evolving from express conditions of survivorship should afford no basis for an implication of
survival.").
51. 267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966).
52. Roberts, supra note 48, at 22.
53. Lawson, 267 N.C. at 643, 148 S.E.2d at 547.
54. Id. at 645, 148 S.E.2d at 548.
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answer the roll... acquire any estate in the properties granted;"5s therefore, the
interests of the predeceased class members failed to vest. The Lawson court
implied "a survival requirement on the alternative contingent remaindermen"5 6
designated as a class.
North Carolina courts historically have not imposed such a requirement of
survival upon individually named contingent remaindermen.5 7 Although the
North Carolina Supreme Court considered the effect of an alternative contingent
remainder to a class in Sanderlin v. Deford,5 s the court noted that "if the chil-
dren, instead of being designated as a class, had each been named personally, the
interests, though contingent, would have devolved upon the administrators of.
such of them as died in the life-time of [the life tenant]." '5 9
In allowing the devisability of contingent future interests, North Carolina
courts have distinguished between remainders contingent upon an unascertained
person (such as a gift to the children of A when A has no children) and remain-
ders contingent upon an uncertain event (such as a devise to B if A dies without
children). 60 Accordingly, "contingent interests, such as contingent remainders,
springing uses, and executory devises may be 'sold, assigned, transmitted or de-
vised' provided the identity of the persons who will take the estate upon the
happening of the contingency be ascertained. ' 61 As an ascertained individual,,
rather than a member of a class, B may convey his contingent interest, even
before the occurrence of the contingent event.62 Moreover, B's death prior to
the event does not invalidate his interest. 63 The unborn children of A, however,
55. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 84, 130 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1963)).
56. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
57. See id. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169 ("North Carolina courts have seemed to apply different
rules of survivorship according to whether the contingent remainder interest was a class gift or a gift
to ascertained individuals.").
58. 47 N.C. (1 Jones) 75 (1854).
59. Id. at 77; accord Jernigan v. Lee, 279 N.C. 341, 346, 182 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1971) (executory
devisee's ability to convey his future interest did not depend upon his surviving previous devisees);
Seawell v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629, 86 S.E.2d 256 (1955) (Individually named beneficiaries of a testa-
mentary trust, with a contingent remainder dependent upon the death of the testators son without
issue, predeceased the son. Id. at 632-33, 86 S.E.2d at 259. The supreme court affirmed the lower
court's decision, allowing the trust property to vest in the heirs of each deceased individual benefici-
ary. Id. at 638, 86 S.E.2d at 263.); Davis v. Davis, 3 N.C. App. 536, 541, 165 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1969)
(ascertained individual with a remainder contingent upon the life tenant's death without issue could
assign her interest before the life tenant's death); see also Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 722, 9
S.E.2d 420, 425 (1940) ("the roll call principle does not apply" to beneficiaries named as individuals
rather than as a class).
60. See Newkirk v. Hawes, 58 N.C. (I Jones Eq.) 265, 267 (1859).
61. Jernigan v. Lee, 279 N.C. 341, 345, 182 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1971) (citations omitted); accord
Seawell v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629, 637, 86 S.E.2d 256, 261-62 (1955); Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23
N.C. (1 Ired.) 566, 570 (1841).
62. Seawell, 241 N.C. at 637, 86 S.E.2d at 261.
63. Moore's Adm'r v. Barrow's Ex'r, 24 N.C. (1 Ired.) 436, 438-39 (1842). But see Poindexter
v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 376-77, 128 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1963) ("A vested
estate is transmittable, a contingent estate is not."); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235
N.C. 446, 452, 70 S.E.2d 578, 582 (1952) (also finding that contingent interests are not transmitta-
ble). In Poindexter and Schneider the courts considered the effect of a contingent remainder condi-
tioned expressly upon survival. Poindexter, 258 N.C. at 376, 128 S.E.2d at 871; Schneider, 235 N.C.
at 448-49, 70 S.E.2d at 580. The vesting of the contingent remainders depended upon which individ-
uals survived the life tenant, and unascertained takers may not transfer their contingent interests.
Thus, the Poindexter and Schneider courts did not contradict the established rule that an ascertained
1348 [Vol. 68
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as members of a class, may not transfer their future interests, for their identity is
as yet unascertainable.
In 1961 North Carolina codified the established right of an ascertained con-
tingent remainderman to transfer, devise, or assign his interest.64 By its terms,
however, the statute applies only to conveyances effective on or after October 1,
1961.65 Because the statute only applies prospectively, courts continue to rely on
the precedent established by North Carolina common law for gifts created
before October 1961.66
The North Carolina Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the interests
created by the testator's will in Rawls.67 The court defined Izetta's future inter-
est as an alternative contingent remainder.68 A contingent remainder "is a re-
mainder which is 'either subject to a condition precedent (in addition to the.
natural expiration of prior estates), or owned by unascertainable persons, or
both.' ",69 The court of appeals in Rawls relied upon Davis v. Davis70 as support
for its finding that Izetta Rawls held a contingent remainder.71 Moreover, the
taker of a contingent interest may transfer her interest. The courts interpreted the rule of transmissi-
bility correctly, although the courts' broad statement of transmissibility may engender confusion.
64. Act of May 16, 1961, ch. 435, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 590 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-
6.3 (1984)).
65. Id. According to the statute:
The conveyance, by deed or will, of an existing future interest shall not be ineffective on the
sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contingent. All future interests in real
or personal property, including all reversions, executory interests, [and] vested and contin-
gent remainders... may be conveyed by the owner thereof ... subject, however, to all
conditions and limitations to which such future interest is subject.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3.
66. For example, in Jernigan v. Lee, 279 N.C. 341, 182 S.E.2d 351 (1971), the court interpreted
interests created by the testator's will, effective upon the testator's death in 1921. The court men-
tioned § 39-6.3 but nonetheless relied upon the established case law. Id. at 345-46, 182 S.E.2d at
355.
67. 94 N.C. App. 677, 381 S.E.2d 166, disc rev. denied, 325 N.C. 547, 385 S.E.2d 500 (1989).
68. Id. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168 (relying upon T. BERGIN & P. HAsKELL, PREFACE TO Es-
TATES IN LAND AND FuTURE INTERES 73 (2d ed. 1984)); see also Lawson v. Lawson, 267 N.C.
643, 644, 148 S.E.2d 546, 547-48 (1966) ("'Alternative remainders limited upon a single precedent
estate are always contingent. Such remainders are created by a limitation to one for life, with re-
mainder in fee to his children ... and, in default of such children... to another...."' (quoting 33
AM. JUR. Life Estates, Remainders & Reversions § 148 (1941))).
69. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra
note 68, at 73 (2d ed. 1984)); see also Lawson, 267 N.C. at 643-44, 148 S.E.2d at 547 (testator's
devise to his daughter for life, "and at her death to her children, if any, in fee simple; if none, to the
whole brothers and sisters of [his] daughter" presented a "typical example of a contingent
remainder").
70. 3 N.C. App. 536, 165 S.E.2d 553 (1969).
71. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168. The court cited Davis as an "example
analogous to [the] case at bar which holds the remainders are contingent." Id. The decision in
Davis, however, mistakenly characterized the future interests. The testator's will in Davis included "a
devise to Lizzie Barnes for life, remainder to her children or grandchildren; and, if she should die
leaving no child or issue of such, then to Christian Davis and Melissa Aycock." Davis, 3 N.C. App.
at 538, 165 S.E.2d at 554. According to the court, Christian Davis and Melissa Aycock each held a
contingent remainder. Id. at 538, 165 S.E.2d at 555. Yet the testator's devise created a vested
remainder in the children or grandchildren of the life tenant: the condition attached to the chil-
dren's gift operated as a condition subsequent, rather than a condition precedent. See T. BERGIN &
P. HASKELL, supra note 68, at 71 (A transfer "to A for life, then to B and his heirs; but if B does not
survive A, to C and his heirs" gives B a vested remainder subject to complete divestment. Because
remainders may not follow an estate in fee, id. at 65, the court should have characterized the devise
1990] 1349
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court found that the Davis decision dictated the result of Rawls.72
In Davis the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined whether an as-
certained individual could assign his contingent interest even before occurrence
of the contingent event. 73 Interpreting earlier North Carolina Supreme Court
cases, 74 the court established the validity of an assignment by a remainderman
whose interest "was contingent not because of the uncertainty of the person who
was to take, but because of the uncertainty of the event."'75
In Rawls v. Early the alternative contingent remainder of Izetta depended
upon an uncertain event: the life tenant's death without issue.76 Based upon
Davis, the court concluded, "the ultimate taker, Izetta Rawls, is ascertained." 77
As the ascertained ultimate taker, Izetta could devise her interest to her heirs at
law, even upon predeceasing the life tenant. The Rawls decision relied upon the
doctrine of transferability of contingent interests in its refusal to impose the class
survivorship requirement upon an individual contingent interest.
Other courts have followed a similar line of reasoning in refusing to require
that ascertained contingent remaindermen survive the life tenant.78 Construing
to Christian and Melissa as a shifting executory interest. See id. at 80 (a transfer "to A and his heirs;
but if A marries X, to B and his heirs" gives B a shifting executory interest).
The court of appeals failed to recognize this distinction in Rawls, relying upon Davis without
questioning its characterization of the future interests. See Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 680, 381 S.E.2d
at 168. Although the Rawls court concluded correctly that the interest created in Izetta was a
contingent remainder, the court should have chosen better precedent to support its conclusion. For
an example of such precedent, see Lawson v. Lawson, 267 N.C. 643, 148 SE.2d 546 (1966). The
testator in Lawson devised a life estate to her daughter, and at her death "to her children, if any, in
fee simple; if none, to the whole brothers and sisters" of the testator's daughter. Id. at 643, 148
S.E.2d at 547. The Lawson court stated that the case presented "a typical example of a contingent
remainder." Id. at 644, 148 S.E.2d at 547.
Recognition of the correct name of the future interest would not have altered the court's deci-
sion in Davis (and thus, in Rawls). Little distinction exists today between executory interests and
contingent remainders; such labels have become almost functionless. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL,
supra note 68, at 114-15. Furthermore, both executory devises and contingent remainders to ascer-
tained persons may be assigned, devised, or transmitted. See Davis, 3 N.C. App. at 539, 165 S.E.2d
at 556.
72. Raws, 94 N.C. App. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
73. Davis, 3 N.C. App. at 538, 165 S.E.2d at 554.
74. Cases relied upon by the Davis court include Seaweil v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629, 86 S.E.2d
256 (1955) (contingent remainder to ascertained individuals held devisable to heirs); Hobgood v.
Hobgood, 169 N.C. 485, 86 S.E. 189 (1915) (contingent remainder to ascertained individuals held
devisable to heirs); Watson v. Smith, 110 N.C. 6, 14 S.E. 640 (1892) (assignment of contingent
remainder upheld in equity); and Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 566 (1841) (ascer-
tained persons may assign executory interests).
75. Davis, 3 N.C. App. at 541, 165 S.E.2d at 557.
76. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 680, 381 S.E.2d at 168.
77. Id. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
78. See Saulsberry v. Second Nat'l Bank, 400 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Ky. 1966) ("[W]here there is no
uncertainty as to the person who is to take, and his surviving some particular... event does not
[form] the contingency upon which the remainder is intended to take effect, if the remainderman dies
before the contingency happens, his interest will pass to his heirs.") (quoting 33 AM. JUn. Life
Estates, Remainders, and Reversions § 152 (1941)); Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 387, 209 S,W.
535, 538 (1919) (interest contingent upon an event, not a person, is "more than a mere possibility,"
and the contingent remainderman may convey such an interest); Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243,
256, 71 A. 999, 1004 (1909) (contingent remainderman may devise his interest "as theperson to take
was certain, and there was nothing in the will... which indicated [the testator's] intention that such
interest or right as a contingent remainderman may have, before the happening of the contingency,
should be postponed until the death of the life tenant"); King v. First Nat'l Bank, 135 N.J. Eq. 319,
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the remainder as contingent-yet devisable, assignable, and transmissible-
avoids the problems inherent in characterizing the interest as a "vested interest
in a contingent remainder." 79 Such an imprecise definition of remainders adds to
the complexity of future interests: "the use of both terms with reference to one
particular interest is calculated to engender confusion." °8 0 Reference to an inter-
est as a vested interest in a contingent remainder allows the remainderman to
devise his interest;8 1 the description apparently refers to "a type of contingent
remainder which is alienable or transmissible." 82 The use of the "vested interest
in a contingent remainder" accomplishes the same result as a simple finding that
contingent interests to ascertained individuals are transmissible and devisable.
Courts use both constructions to avoid an implied requirement of
survivorship.83
By allowing Izetta Rawls to devise her contingent remainder, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals explicitly rejected application of an implied survivor-
ship requirement to an individual contingent remainderman.8 4 The court re-
fused to extend the holding of Lawson v. Lawson,85 which "implied a survival
requirement on the alternative contingent remaindermen" designated as a
class.8 6 As the Rawls court emphasized, Lawson "is distinguishable from the
present case... in that Lawson involved an alternative contingent remainder to
a class. North Carolina courts seem to have applied different rules of survivor-
ship according to whether the contingent remainder was a class gift or a gift to
324-25, 38 A.2d 445, 448 (1944) (an individual who predeceased the holder of the preceding estate
held an executory interest with "the same incidents of devisability as an ordinary contingent remain-
der in which the contingency is as to an event and not as to the person"); Moore v. MeAlester, 428
P.2d 266, 271 (Okla. 1967) (alternative contingent remaindermen, certain and identifiable individu-
als, could devise their interests); Black v. Todd, 121 S.C. 243, 252, 113 S.E. 793, 796 (1922) ("The
well-established doctrine ... in this jurisdiction... [is] that a contingent remainder is transmissible
where the contingency depends upon the event and not upon the person ....").
For another construction used to avoid requirements of survival for contingent interests, see
Implied Condition of Survivorship, supra note 26, at 137 (courts may find that the interest vests at the
death of the testator but is subject to divestment upon the contingent event). See also Baldwin v.
Hambleton, 196 Kan. 353, 358, 411 P.2d 626, 630-31 (1966) ("A remainder limited to a class con-
sisting of children vest in such children as are in being at the time the will takes effect."); Patton v.
Corley, 107 W. Va. 318, 321, 148 S.E. 120, 121 (1929) (the preference for early vesting may lead
courts to find that contingent remainders vest at the death of the testator).
79. See McAlester, 428 P.2d at 271 (testator's devise to two sons should his daughter die with-
out issue described as "vested interest in a contingent remainder which was not divested by their
subsequent deaths before the death of [the life tenant]"); Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 269,
227 P. 6, 11 (1924) (Although remainder was contingent on the death of the life income beneficiary
without issue, the court defined the interest as a vested remainder. The identity of the remainderman
was certain "and he was capable and competent to take possession and enter into the enjoyment
thereof the moment the prior estates would determine." With a vested remainder, the remainder-
man could assign and devise his interest.).
80. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 1, § 112, at 94.
81. See Shufeldt, 130 Wash. at 269, 227 P. at 11.
82. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 1, § 112, at 94.
83. For an explanation of the relationship between the doctrine of transferability and avoidance
of an implied requirement of survivorship, see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
84. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 681-82, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
85. 267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966).
86. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169 (citing Lawson, 267 N.C. at 645, 148 S.E.2d
at 548).
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ascertained individuals."' 87 The court wisely refused to extend the holding of
Lawson. Commentators have recognized the type of error committed by the
Lawson court: courts should not imply a survivorship requirement merely be-
cause the interest is a contingent remainder, subject to another condition prece-
dent. 88 The Lawson court relied upon language used to interpret express
survivorship conditions as precedent for implying a condition of survivorship.8 9
Further, the court in Lawson failed to recognize that earlier cases used the "roll
call" language to determine which among several potential classes of takers,
rather than which members of a single class, received an interest.90
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has criticized the Lawson decision,
noting that the implied requirement of survival may disinherit "whole fines of a
testator's intended takers" 9 1 and concluding that "Lawson is in need of further
review."' 92 Disinheritance of the intended takers, which may result in intestacy,
is but one effect of an implied requirement of survival.93 An implied condition of
survivorship also results in an undisposed remainder interest. 94 Even "[a] simple
statutory imposition of survival requirements... would leave in its wake very
substantial problems of widespread undisposed of reversionary interests." 95 This
requirement of survival also may frustrate the testator's intent.9 6 Courts re-
jecting an implied condition of survivorship have assumed that if the testator
wanted the remainderman to survive the life tenant, the testator would have
87. Id. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
88. L. SudEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 1, § 135, at 114-16; T. BEROIN & P. HASKELL, supra note
68, at 131 (implying condition of survivorship based upon another condition precedent described as
an "anomalous rule"); 2A R. POWELL, THE LAw oF REAL PROPERTY 1334, at 797 (1990) (citing
REsrATEmEw OF PROPERTY § 261); Halbach, Future Interests." Express and Implied Conditions of
Survival Part II, 49 CALIF. L. Rnv. 431, 439 (1961); Note, supra note 47, at 264-65.
89. In Lawson the supreme court relied upon Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22
(1963), which interpreted a transfer of property to the wife for life, then to the surviving children.
Lawson, 267 N.C. at 645, 148 S.E.2d at 548; see also Note, supra note 47, at 269 ("[A] rule evolving
from express conditions of survivorship should afford no basis for an implication of survival.").
90. See Roberts, supra note 48, at 17 & n.109. According to Roberts, in earlier North Carolina
cases, such as Rees v. Williams, 164 N.C. 128, 80 S.E. 247 (1913), "[Ihe sense of the ["roll call"
language] ... was that until the death of the first taker with or without issue it could not be deter-
mined which among several possible classes of ultimate takers ... would have an interest." Id. at
n.109. The Lawson court, however, applied the "roll call" language to require members of the same
class to survive the life tenant. Lawson, 267 N.C. at 645, 148 S.E.2d at 548.
91. Tunnell v. Berry, 73 N.C. App. 222, 227, 326 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1985) (citing T. BEROIN &
P. HASKELL, supra note 68, at 131).
92. Id.
93. See Future Interests, supra note 26, at 207 (noting that Michigan courts usually attempt to
avoid intestacy, yet "frequently [an implied survival requirement] will produce intestacy"). For an
example of intestacy resulting from the survivorship requirement, see Schau v. Cecil, 257 Iowa 1296,
1301, 136 N.W.2d 515, 519 (1965) (The contingent remainder failed to vest, and the testator's will
contained no residuary clause. Thus, the property descended through intestacy to the testators
heirs,). Cf Jossey v. Brown, 119 Ga. 758, 763, 47 S.E. 350, 353 (1904) (court considered that the
testator did not intend partial intestacy in refusing to impose a requirement of survival upon the
ascertained contingent remainderman); Concord Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 113 N.H. 490, 494, 310 A.2d
130, 133 (1973) (court weighed construction against intestacy in rejecting survival requirement).
94. In Re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 788, 361 P.2d 900, 905, 13 Cal. Rptr. 180, 185 (1961).
95. French, Imposing a General Survival Requirement on Beneficiaries of Future Interests: Solv.
ing the Problems Caused By The Death ofa Beneficiary Before the Time Set for Distribution, 27 ARIZ.
L. REv. 801, 835 (1985).
96. Note, supra note 2, at 945; cf T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 68, at 128 ("the
implied condition of survivorship tends to disturb orderly and rational dispositive plans").
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expressed such an intention. 97 Finally, application of implied conditions of sur-
vivorship would limit the devisability and descendibility of contingent
interests.98
Without the implication of a survivorship requirement, courts may dis-
tribute the property to the estate of the remainderman. 99 Reopening the estate of
the remainderman, perhaps years after his death, may result in "unnecessary
taxes, probate expenses, and creditors' claims."' 0 0 Moreover, if courts refuse to
imply a condition of survivorship, the testator's property may "be diverted to
takers that the donor would not have wanted to receive the property." 10 1 Al-
lowing the remainderman to devise her interest-even though she may die
before the interest vests-gives the beneficiary the power to leave property to
persons outside the family. 102
One commentator has proposed imposition of a statutory survival require-
ment, naming alternative beneficiaries to take should the beneficiary die before
the time set for distribution of his interest.10 3 With a survivorship requirement,
the costs of reopening the beneficiary's estate would be avoided.10 4 Further-
more, a survivorship requirement would limit alienability of contingent inter-
ests;' 05 the contingent remainderman may not transfer his interest before the
interest vests, perhaps avoiding a devise contrary to the testator's intent. 1°6
The proponents of an implied statutory requirement of survival do admit
the substantial advantages of refusing to imply a condition of survivorship. Al-
lowing a beneficiary to devise his interest before the time of distribution allows
the beneficiary greater flexibility10 7 and is "closer to what a sound estate plan
97. Eg., Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 256, 71 A. 999, 1004 (1909) ("IThere was nothing in
the will... which indicated [the testator's] intention that such interest or right as a contingent
remainderman may have, before the happening of the contingency, should be postponed until the
death of the life tenant."); Tapley v. Dill, 358 Mo. 824, 831, 217 S.W.2d 369, 373 (1949) (contingent
remainderman's "survival of the particular estate was designedly not made a condition to his rights
under testator's will").
98. In Re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 787, 361 P.2d 900, 904, 13 Cal. Rptr. 180, 184 (1961).
As the Ferry court explained, "[s]ince property passes by descent or devise only on the death of the
previous owner,.. . a contingent remainder could only pass by descent or devise where the contin-
gent remainderman need not survive the holder of the previous estate." Id. at n.4. Thus, with an
implied condition of survivorship, only those contingent remaindermen who survive the life tenant
could devise their interests. See also Note, supra note 2, at 944 (result of decision in Schau to imply
survivorship condition limited alienability of property). The Note also mentions that Schau's sur-
vival requirement created a reversionary interest, for the contingent remainder failed to vest. The
heirs of the grantor will receive this reversion, and as a result, merger of the life estate and future
interests (to produce a fee simple absolutp) will become more difficult. Id. at 943-44.
99. See French, supra note 95, at 804. When a beneficiary dies before the time set for distribu-
tion, courts may find that the interest is vested, allowing the beneficiary's estate to receive the inter-
est. Id.
100. Id. at 835.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 819.
103. See id. at 835-36.
104. Id. at 805.
105. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107. French, supra note 95, at 819.
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would accomplish." 108 Moreover, the beneficiary, who normally shares the tes-
tator's "concern for the family's well-being," 1° 9 is in a better position than the
courts to determine what is best for the family. 110 Although reopening the estate
of the beneficiary may be expensive, one possible solution is to distribute the
property directly to the beneficiary's heirs, rather than to the closed estate.111
Such a solution saves administrative costs, although the possibility of creditors'
claims and taxes remains. 112
The advantages of a condition of survivorship do not justify implying a
condition that may frustrate the testator's intent, result in disinheritance, and
restrict the alienability of future interests. The disadvantages of an implied con-
dition of survivorship, along with the established rule of transferability of certain
contingent interests in North Carolina, support the court of appeals' refusal to
imply a condition of survivorship in Rawls. The Rawls court found that an as-
certained individual may devise her contingent interest, even though she may
predecease the life tenant. 13 Recognizing the distinction between contingent in-
terests to classes and contingent interests to individuals enabled the court to
refuse to extend the much-criticized implied survivorship requirement of Law-
son. With its refusal to imply a condition of survivorship, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals ensured the continued transferability of contingent future in-
terests and avoided implying a condition which serves to frustrate the intent of
testators.
SUSAN REBECCA BOWEN
108. Id. at 817.
109. Id. at 818.
110. Id. at 817-18.
111. Although the New York courts rejected such a solution in In Re Woodcock's Will, 19 Misc.
2d 268, 272, 186 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (1959), such a solution appears well-established in Delaware. In
Security Trust Co. v. Cooling, 31 Del. Ch. 423, 76 A.2d 1 (1950), the court determined that the
testator's devise to the issue of his grandchildren violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, resulting in
intestacy. Rather than distributing the property through the estate of the testator's widow, the court
ordered the trustee to distribute the property directly to the beneficiaries of the widow's will. Id. at
431-32, 76 A.2d at 5. The Delaware Chancery Court applied the rule of Cooling in a case analogous
to Rawls v. Early. In Security Trust Co. v. Irvine, 33 Del. Ch. 375, 93 A.2d 528 (1953), the court
determined that the remainder to the testator's brothers and sisters vested at the testator's death,
rather than at the death of the surviving life tenant. Id. at 380, 93 A.2d at 531. Therefore, the
brothers and sisters who predeceased the life tenant received an interest in the testator's property.
Following the decision of Cooling, the court in Irvine ordered distribution of the property "directly
to the persons entitled," rather than through the estates of the deceased brothers and sisters. Id. at
383, 93 A.2d at 532.
112. See WILLs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATEs 726-27 (J. Dukeminier & S. Johanson 3d ed. 1984).
113. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. at 681, 381 S.E.2d at 169.
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